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1  | INTRODUCTION
In this article, we explore interactional practices which involve a 
person with intellectual disability and their conversation partner. 
In England, people with intellectual disabilities sometimes have 
personal assistants (PAs) when they are paid for by the individual's 
personal budget. However, since the focus here is on social interac‐
tion, a “conversation partner” could be anyone, maybe a volunteer, 
a friend or a formal paid support worker. At an international level, 
not all countries have a welfare system designed to support disabled 
people in their independent living (Priestley, 2001, p. 3). What is 
truly global is communication itself. We are interested here in how 
these interactions support or undermine the autonomy and control 
of the individual, and how they are played out on a day‐to‐day basis 
in real time.
Pervasive notions of autonomy in Western culture emphasize 
the desirability of independence and self‐determination. Self‐reli‐
ance is viewed as an individual achievement and one that many dis‐
abled people, who may require assistance with daily living, are not 
able to aspire to. However, “choice and control” are salient themes 
in policy about personalized services for all disabled people in the 
UK (Glendinning, 2008) and have particularly been highlighted in 
intellectual disability services, where people's lives have tradition‐
ally been dominated by protection (Stainton & Boyce, 2004). We 
know that these are also seen as important issues in many other 
countries, including Malta (Callus & Bonelli, 2017), Australia (Bigby, 
 
Received: 23 March 2018  |  Revised: 13 December 2018  |  Accepted: 27 February 2019
DOI: 10.1111/jar.12595  
O R I G I N A L  A R T I C L E
Managing relational autonomy in interactions: People with 
intellectual disabilities
Sandra Dowling1 |   Val Williams1  |   Joe Webb2 |   Marina Gall3 |   Deborah Worrall1
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, 
provided the original work is properly cited.
© 2019 The Authors. Journal of Applied Research in Intellectual Disabilities Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd
1Norah Fry Centre for Disability Studies, 
School for Policy Studies, University of 
Bristol, Bristol, UK
2Centre for Academic Primary 
Care, University of Bristol, Bristol, UK
3School of Education, University of Bristol, 
Bristol, UK
Correspondence
Val Williams, Norah Fry Centre for Disability 
Studies, School for Policy Studies, University 
of Bristol, Bristol, UK.
Email: Val.williams@bristol.ac.uk
Funding information
This research was funded by a grant from 
the Economic and Social Research Council: 
ES/M008339/1.
Abstract
Background: This article is about interactions that occur when someone with intel‐
lectual disabilities is engaged in everyday activities with a personal assistant (PA) or a 
support worker.
Method: We examine the detail of nine hours of naturally occurring video‐recorded 
interactions, to explore how “relational autonomy” is done in practice. Nine people 
with ID and seven staff took part in the research, which took place in England from 
2016–17.
Results: We selected six extracts to illustrate different types of joint decision‐mak‐
ing. Informed by inclusive research with a drama group of people with intellectual 
disabilities, we focus on the ways in which (a) future plans are discussed; (b) choices 
are offered during an activity; (c) people reflect on their decisions.
Conclusion: The article concludes with discussion about the teaching and learning 
content of choice‐making, on relational autonomy, and the practice learning for PAs, 
support workers and for people with intellectual disabilities.
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Whiteside, & Douglas, 2017; Dowse, 2009) and the United States 
(Schelly, 2008). Many of these authors turn to the UN Convention 
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UN, 2007) which en‐
shrines the right to legal capacity for disabled people in Article 12, 
and further the right to have all necessary supports to exercise that 
capacity. This has been the basis for legal frameworks such as the 
2005 Mental Capacity Act in England and Wales, and for models of 
supported decision making (SDM) (Bach, 2017; Bigby et al., 2017), a 
process “by which a third party …assists or helps an individual with 
an intellectual or cognitive disability to make legally enforceable de‐
cisions by themselves” (Devi, 2013, pp 792–793). It should not be 
assumed, simply because someone has an intellectual disability, that 
they cannot make a decision. Conversely, well‐intentioned support 
workers may hold back from offering support to a person with an 
intellectual disability in managing decisions in order to ensure they 
are able to exercise their autonomy freely and without coercion. In 
this article, we are concerned with moments in which the principles 
of autonomy are translated into interaction with support workers, 
during the course of everyday life. As Beadle‐Brown (2015) sug‐
gests, we do not need new legislation, as much as the impetus to 
change the “culture of support” (p. 26).
“Relational autonomy” highlights how the ability to have control 
and agency in one's life requires interdependence, not isolated inde‐
pendence (Morris, 2004; Perkins, Ball, Whittington, & Hollingsworth, 
2012). It is regularly highlighted in research relating to people with in‐
tellectual disabilities (Johnson, Walmsley, & Wolfe, 2010), and builds 
on ideas in disability theory, particularly the “relational” model of 
disability (Callus & Bonelli, 2017; Goodley, 2011; Tøssebro, 2013). If 
disability is situated at the interface of impairment and the environ‐
ment with which a person comes into contact, then it makes sense 
to look towards relationships (Forrester‐Jones et al., 2006; Jamieson, 
Theodore, & Raczka, 2016; Simplican, Leader, Kosciulek, & Leahy, 
2015; Williams & Porter, 2017) as an important place in which dis‐
abling or enabling effects will play out. Most research in this area 
is based on interviews or focus groups (Bigby et al., 2017; Jamieson 
et al., 2016), where participants are asked to talk about the ways in 
which they make joint decisions in the context of “a good working 
relationship,” although Dunn, Clare, and Holland (2010) did include 
some ethnographic observation when asking support workers about 
how they made decisions for people with intellectual disabilities. 
Authors more frequently discuss relational autonomy as an abstract 
concept, rather than considering in detail the variety of ways in which 
it plays out in interaction, which is the path followed in this article.
There is a small collection of detailed research in Conversation 
Analysis exploring the “institutional” inequalities which can be ob‐
served in interactions involving people with intellectual disabilities. 
Antaki, Walton, and Finlay (2007) have shown how conversations 
with people with intellectual disabilities can construct them as in‐
competent. They have also analysed instructions given by sup‐
port workers (Antaki, 2013; Antaki & Kent, 2012) and the ways in 
which choices may be undermined in everyday conversations in the 
home (Antaki, Finlay, Walton, & Pate, 2008). Williams (2011) high‐
lighted similar findings in one‐to‐one interactions, drawing on data 
collected in 2002–2004. The aim there was to capture more empow‐
ering and positive interactions with personal assistants. Similarly, 
Jepson (2011) examined the detail of conversations between sup‐
port workers and people with intellectual disabilities specifically in 
the light of the Mental Capacity Act in England, finding evidence that 
the third principle (that “unwise decisions” do not equate with lack 
of capacity) was easily flouted, with supporters advising, persuad‐
ing and guiding choices. For instance, healthy eating principles could 
take precedence over someone's initial choice.
The current paper thus builds on this interest in the actual inter‐
actions which take place when a person with intellectual disability is 
receiving support. Unlike Jepson (2011) and Antaki et al. (2008), we 
turn to contexts where there is a presumption that the person with 
intellectual disability will be “empowered” by employing their own 
PA, or by being in control of their own social enterprise. Our ques‐
tions in this paper have a central focus on different strategies for 
doing “relational autonomy” which emerge from interactions. Our 
research questions are as follows:
• In what ways do communication partners undermine or support 
decision making by people with intellectual disabilities?
• How do those decisions play out in the course of everyday activi‐
ties and in the context of a relationship between the two people?
• What implications do these findings have for personal assistants 
(PAs) and others who support people with intellectual disabilities?
2  | METHODOLOGY
The data in this article were collected during a three‐year (2015–
2018) research programme "Getting Things Changed" which 
was about understanding and changing disabling social practices 
(Williams et al., 2018). The various strands of our project conceptu‐
alize social practices and change in different ways, and the present 
paper is based on a conversation analytic approach (CA) (Sidnell & 
Stivers, 2012). The main features of the CA approach are that data 
are collected which are “naturally occurring,” with an interest in how 
the fine detail of communication is organized. It should be noted 
however that our goal here is to present our analysis to a wider audi‐
ence, and so the transcription conventions familiar in CA have not 
been used. This paper aims instead to use CA insights to examine a 
specific, institutional context for people with intellectual disabilities, 
and we have made an attempt at an accessible account for readers 
without specific CA knowledge.
Conversation analysis is epistemologically distinct from many 
qualitative methodologies, which are about people's intentions, 
feelings and reflections. CA by contrast is more interested in the 
structure and shape of talk, and the actions performed in everyday 
interactions (Schegloff, 2007). Those actions (such as questions‐an‐
swers; corrections or praise‐giving) play out in certain revealing ways 
when a person with intellectual disability is talking with a conversa‐
tion partner. In the current project, 9 hr, 6 min of video data were 
collected with nine people with intellectual disabilities in England, 
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in different contexts, by each of the first three authors. The primary 
interactional context is a one‐to‐one conversation with a personal 
assistant, with a secondary setting being a workshop setting where 
two members of staff were supporting people with intellectual dis‐
abilities to carry out craft work.
The participants with intellectual disability all had expressive 
language, and most would be described in the UK as having moder‐
ate learning disabilities. All names used in this paper are anonymized, 
and details of participants are given in Table 1.
Making videos with people with intellectual disabilities has many 
ethical implications, and beyond the usual informed consent, we 
were careful to develop research protocols in which participants 
could familiarize themselves and find out more about the research 
before agreeing to take part, using accessible information and a re‐
cruitment video on some occasions. We conducted initial interviews 
with those who agreed, asking both the PA and the person with intel‐
lectual disability what mattered most to them when they interacted, 
and we also took videos back to those we had filmed, in order to ask 
them about their feelings and reactions to the video. Participants 
were given the option of deleting specific parts of their data, but 
in fact, no‐one chose to do so. This strand of our research was ap‐
proved by the Social Care Research Ethics Committee for England.
Video data collection was carried out following lengthy periods 
of familiarization with the researcher. The people with intellectual 
disability chose when to switch on the small hand‐held camcorder, 
and what activities could be recorded, with the researcher where 
possible withdrawing from the scene. The video data included con‐
versations at home during domestic activities, planning and carrying 
out food shopping, going for a walk, playing outdoors sport, pre‐
paring food, eating in a café, disassembling furniture to return it to 
a store, caring for a baby, and conversations in the craft workshop.
Extracts for analysis were selected after repeated watching 
of the raw data, and discussions within the team. Unusually for 
Conversation Analysis, however, we wished to ensure that the points 
we noticed in the data were relevant and important for people with 
intellectual disabilities themselves; during this stage, therefore, we 
bought in the services of a company of disabled actors, the Misfits 
Theatre Company (2018), who had previously been engaged as 
project advisors. They helped us by reconstructing and role‐playing 
scenes selected as potentially interesting by the authors. Six meet‐
ings were organized and filmed by Sandra Dowling with 6–8 actors, 
all of whom had experience in different ways of interacting with sup‐
porters or personal assistants. Their insights informed the analysis 
in this paper, and in the final stages of our project, they produced a 
video for other people with intellectual disabilities who employ PAs 
which includes some of their dramatic re‐constructions. We mention 
some of their specific points throughout the paper.
During this stage, short extracts were isolated and transcribed 
in detail, in order to focus specifically on patterns of turn‐taking and 
sequencing. In CA what matters is not just “what” someone says, 
but how each utterance is linked to and reveals how the previous 
utterance was taken (Sidnell & Stivers, 2012). We took as wide a 
view as possible of what might constitute relational autonomy, not 
starting with any fixed ideas, and made a collection of 84 instances 
where the autonomy, choice or decision of the person with intellec‐
tual disability was made “visible” in the talk or the embodied action. 
We then sorted them into a loose classification system, first of all 
according to who initiated the sequence, and secondly according to 
what seemed to be the main outcome achieved. The current article 
builds on this wider collection in order to focus back down on spe‐
cific extracts which have been chosen to develop insights into the 
various ways in which relational autonomy is manifested in action.
TA B L E  1   Participants
Pseudonym Age bracket Everyday life and independence Communicating choices
Length of relationship with 
communication partner(s)
Paul 18–24 Lives in parents’ home with PAs 
after college in evening
Can express own choices and 
preferences
Rik (4 months) and Ann (about 
1 year)
Katie 18–24 Lives in parents’ home, goes to 
college ‐ but filmed in PA's home
Can express own choices, can plan 
ahead for herself
Lola: 3–4 years
Lyn 41–49 Filmed in craft workshop: a 
beginner in some skills there
Quiet, takes time to respond, but 
good understanding
Sally: 1 year
Wendy 41–49 Lives in own flat in sheltered 
housing block
Sophisticated communicator, can 
express what she wants PAs to do
Sarah: 3 months
Jen 25–30 Lives in own flat, with PA visits Sophisticated communicator, can 
plan and manage own life
Rachel: 5–6 months
Anna 31–35 Lives in own flat with a few hours 
PA support
Vocal self‐advocate: can choose 
and plan her own life
Pamela: 9 months
Jon 36–40 Filmed in craft workshop: skilled 
potter
Vocal self‐advocate: can choose 
and plan within the workshop
Sally: 1 year
Fay 25–30 Filmed in craft workshop: skilled 
designer
Can express own choices and 
preferences
Leanne and Sally: 1 year
Marion 41–49 Filmed in craft workshop: skilled 
designer
Quiet, but chooses own activities Sally: 1 year
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3  | FINDINGS
3.1 | Planning for future activities
When a person with intellectual disability is with their PA or sup‐
porter, their possible plans of action are frequently negotiated. Our 
first video extract takes place in a park, where we see three people 
walking along a path, one of them trailing behind the others. This is 
Paul who is accompanied by two personal assistants, Rik and Ann.
One might assume from Line 1 that Paul is simply observing 
something and making conversation. However, that is not how his 
remark is taken. Although Rik affirms the point that it is in fact a 
tennis court, he immediately goes on to suggest a plan of action 
for “next time” they are in the park. Planning forward, noticing 
what Paul might want, and literally putting that next activity on the 
agenda—all these things appear to be routine in the conversation 
that Paul has with his PAs on his walk. Sometimes the suggestions 
come from Paul himself, sometimes they are jointly constructed as 
in Extract 1, and at other times, interactional trouble ensues, as in 
the following extract.
The three people are now a bit further on in the park, with Paul walk‐
ing behind his PAs, and he cuts into a conversation between his two PAs 
about the route they are taking via the park, to introduce the topic of 
dancing.
Paul clearly orients to talking about his future plans when he is with 
his PAs, and that might well be because they are ordinarily entailed in 
organizing these activities for him. In Line 3 Ann quickly picks up on the 
“dancing” and then at Line 7, suggests that Paul could tell the camera 
person about his dancing on Mondays. However, he corrects her as‐
sertion that dancing takes place on a Monday, saying quite clearly that 
it might happen on Sunday, a day when his PAs would not be working 
with him. The dancing plan is something that he may know about, out‐
side his PAs’ domain of knowledge, and by mentioning it, he creates 
himself as an independent decision maker with the epistemic right to 
know about his own life experience. People normatively treat them‐
selves, and are treated by others, as having primary rights to know and 
describe things in their own life and experience (Heritage, 2012; Sacks, 
1984). A point to bear in mind then is that Paul's individual autonomy is 
only visible when he counters something his PAs suggest.
Visually, we also noticed in this interaction that both PAs are 
walking slightly in front of Paul, although Ann turns towards him as 
he starts up the conversation. In a subsequent interview, Ann ex‐
plained that they always walk in front of Paul to encourage him to 
keep moving. However, body position is significant for interaction, 
and CA research has shown how the coordination of body move‐
ments is important for “the jointness of a decision” (Stevanovic et al., 
2017, p. 36). When walking and talking, moreover, actions involving 
objects or place may compete with verbal interaction; at line 24 Ann 
was pulling her smartphone out of her shoulder bag, as she turned 
to acknowledge Paul's comment. “Rik” the second PA was on the 
far side of Ann, and was looking away, and at this point Paul's talk 
about “Sunday” is hearable as “Sunder” or even as “Thunder.” As the 
weather was uncertain, the “thunder” interpretation is checked out 
by Ann first at line 23, who then embarks on a confused interaction 
to determine whether Paul is talking about the here‐and‐now (the 
weather) or about his future plan for dancing. At the same time, we 
can equally see how this is starting to cast Paul as an incompetent or 
muddled decision maker (Robinson, 2006), although his frustrated “I 
told you” at 31 implies that Ann is the muddled party.
Extract 1
01 Paul And this called a tennis court
02 (gestures towards tennis court)
03 Rik Yes, absolutely. We’ll come here and
04 do that next time, yeah?
05 Paul Yeah
Extract 2
01 Paul We will talked about the way err (.)
02 dancing around.
03 Ann You want to talk about dancing
04 around? (walking in
05 front of Paul)
06 Paul Yeah (another pause)
07 Ann What about your‐ y‐you could tell
08 Lisa (camera person)
09 about umm your dancing (glances
10 back towards Paul).
11 You do on a Monday
12 Paul Lisa? (speaking quickly) W‐w where
13 we’re going to do it do it on next
14 Sunday (catches up
15 with Ann and Rik at this point)
16 Ann On a Sunday? We do it on a
17 Monday we do tha‐ or are
18 you going dancing on Sunday?
19 (Paul drops behind).
20 Paul I’m going DOWN in the thunder
21 (gestures downwards
22 with one hand)
23 Ann You’re going dancing in the
24 thunder? (reaches into her
25 bag for phone)
26 Paul No I’m going DOWN in the
27 thunder (hand gesture downwards)
28 Ann You’re going down in the thunder?
29 Paul Yeah
30 Ann Down where?
31 Paul Down in the (s)under I told you.
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When this extract was shown to the Misfits Theatre Company 
(2018) members they strongly felt that Paul's frustration was 
grounded in the fact that he was being ignored both physically and 
in terms of his own meaning. In fact, following Extract 2, he playfully 
disappeared from sight, forcing his PAs to play a game of hide‐and‐
seek with him. A resulting problem was that what Paul did to get 
attention could be considered difficult or “naughty,” and that ulti‐
mately would not serve to equalize the relationship that he had with 
his PAs, but would rather create or reproduce a narrative supporting 
his dependence and need for surveillance.
3.2 | The foregrounding of choice
Unlike Paul's conversations, which are about the negotiation of 
future action, choice can be “offered” during the course of ongo‐
ing activity, and is often closely tied to the accomplishment of the 
activity. In mundane conversation, we all offer choices to others. 
However, if someone has made a choice, and we repeat the original 
offer with something like “Which one do you want?” the natural 
implication is that the person's first choice was wrong. In Antaki 
et al.'s (2008) example, the person with intellectual disability goes 
back to make the opposite choice to his original one, and we have a 
very similar example where a young woman called “Katie” is in the 
kitchen making a salad with her PA, “Lola.” Katie is given the choice 
of two knives and immediately leans forward to touch one of them. 
However, Lola explicitly instructs her about how to make a better 
choice:
Lola's explanation at Line 1 of how, in general, choices should be 
made, implies strongly that Katie's choice was a random one (“eeny‐
meeny” being a way of choosing something by chance). What hap‐
pens as a result? At line 8, Katie reacts to the message that her first 
choice was in some respect wrong. Not only should she put more 
thought into the choice, but she probably ought to choose the other 
knife! She articulates here the reason for that choice, that the cor‐
rect knife to choose was a “little” one, and Lola accepts this with 
a “right” as she replaces the knife, very much as a teacher would 
(Hellermann, 2005).
In other examples, a choice action by a person with intellectual 
disability is immediately followed by negative feedback. For in‐
stance, Paul (the young man walking in the park) wanted to go on a 
motorbike at one point, but was told “No, that doesn't belong to us.” 
A young woman choosing meat for a curry wanted to select “mince” 
but was told there was not much mince there, and that she would be 
“better off with chunks of meat,” and a young woman in the work‐
shop who had selected items for an upcoming display, was told that 
“we want the right colours.” All the people in these examples had 
actively chosen to place themselves in learning situations, and so the 
feedback they receive is perfectly reasonable, even though it places 
them in a K‐ position. On such occasions, there is a demonstrable 
shared understanding of what is right or appropriate, and that in it‐
self can consitute a type of relational autonomy.
In their interviews, our participants often discussed the extent to 
which the PA role included teaching or instructing them to manage 
everyday activities. We can see in Extract 3 how Lola seized on the 
moment, during an ongoing joint activity, to teach Katie about the use 
of sharp knives. In CA, this might be referred to as a “teachable” (Cohen, 
Clark, Lawson, Casucci, & Flocke, 2011; Slembrouck & Hall, 2017). The 
third principle of the MCA, about “unwise decisions” not being equated 
with a lack of capacity, often seems to be flouted in favour of using 
a decision moment as a chance to practise “getting it right” (see also 
Jepson, 2011). The Misfits Theatre Group members included a role‐
play in their training video which was about someone being denied the 
choice of a biscuit by her PA. They discussed at length whether such 
choices should be left to the person with intellectual disability, and con‐
cluded that there were occasions on which the PA needed to step in.
Relational autonomy takes place, in other words, in a wider con‐
text of roles, situations and identities—all relevant to and visible in 
the interaction. For instance, some of our data was filmed in a work 
environment, where the learning of appropriate skills was part of 
the overt aim. Sally here is the support worker, who is preparing clay 
with Jon, one of the clients, while Lyn is waiting at the pottery wheel.
Extract 3
01 Lola that you have to look not
02 just go eeny meeny meeny
03 (walking back to work surface,
04 holds knives up again)
05 which one do you want
06 gonna go with the best
07 Katie points to smaller knife.
08 That one (PA immediately
09 takes other knife back)
10  little one (.) little
11 Lola right
Extract 4
01 Sal how about you Lynn what do you
02 reckon you’d wanna make?
03 (Lyn looks at Sal, pause)
04 It’s got to be round.
05 Lyn (unclear)
06 Sal yeah
07 Lyn I saw it on a DVD
08 Sal a bowl, a plate – or – a vase, but it
09 wouldn’t be a very good
10 vase. (Long pause). A dish?
11 Jon Saucer?
12 Lyn A mug?
13 Sal You want a mug?
14 Lyn Yes I’ve had enough cups
     |  1063
Published for the British Institute of Learning Disabilities  
WILLIAMS et AL.
The first offer Sally makes to Lyn is a very open one, at line 1, and 
it is notable how she pauses each time to allow Lyn to think before 
she responds. This occurs without trouble, since Sally is glancing back 
at the clay in her hands while she addresses Lyn. However, at Line 
4, she follows up the open offer with the restriction that the choice 
has got to be of something “round,” before Lyn has actually made a 
verbal response. This is unlike Extract 3, where the correction by the 
support worker came after the immediate response by Katie about 
the knife. Thus, instead of Lyn appearing incompetent, she has al‐
ready been given the prop she may need to make a good decision 
here. Indeed, it could be said that Lyn has already learnt the principle 
which Katie was being taught, that it is good to stop and think before 
responding with an immediate choice. It is only when Lyn then hesi‐
tates and is unclear about her response in lines 5 and 7, that Sally uses 
her second strategy of naming some alternative possibilities at line 
8: “a bowl, a plate, a vase.” Jon then helps with this by suggesting a 
“saucer,” and this leads to the exchange about a mug or a cup. Again, 
it is interesting how Sally both endorses Lyn's choice, but does not 
commit her to the choice in any way. Instead, she defers the decision 
to a later moment, when “inspiration strikes you,” implying that there 
may be many correct and possible objects which Lyn might choose.
Teachable moments occur frequently during these interactions, 
and of course there are different implications about getting it “right” 
or “wrong.” Maybe it did not matter too much what object or shape 
Lyn chose for her pot, whereas the choice of a knife was part of what 
Katie had to learn in order to be safe in the kitchen. The practical 
point to take from this though is that it is often useful for the sup‐
porter to (a) spell out what the choice is, and the restrictions asso‐
ciated with that choice, (b) when appropriate, endorse a deferral of 
the decision, and (c) “feed” a decision with alternatives, both verbal 
and visual. It is the sequential position of each of these strategies 
which matters, each utterance by the support worker revealing how 
she has listened to and is responding to the person with intellectual 
disability.
3.3 | Making and discussing decisions 
during activity
Thus far, relational autonomy has been displayed in activity contexts: 
the decisions being made are closely tied to the ongoing action, or as 
in Paul's case, are talked about in the context of an ongoing action. 
We have written elsewhere (Antaki & Webb, in press) about the pos‐
sible tension between completing the activity and the conversation 
itself. There were some particularly interesting examples in the data 
of more “reflective” talk about a decision which may have already 
been made, and this type of talk could be initiated either by the 
person with intellectual disability or the PA. In Extract 5, Wendy had 
already asked her PA, Sarah, to disassemble and pack some furniture 
she had previously bought, so that it could be returned to the store.
Throughout this conversation, Sarah is sitting on the floor 
with tools to take the furniture apart, while Wendy is picking up 
plastic wrappers and putting them down beside Sarah. An import‐
ant point this illustrates is that autonomy is not necessarily about 
“doing the job” which you have decided on. The relational element 
of this decision is achieved precisely by Sarah actually carrying 
out the mechanics of the task, watched and commented on by 
Wendy. There is a jointness both in the activity and in ownership 
of the decision, with Sarah's use of “we” from Line 1 onwards, 
despite Wendy's overt reassurance at line 10: “don't worry it's 
my my f‐ my responsibil(ity).” Although the decision has been 
“jointly” made, it is in fact Wendy who stands to lose thirty “quid” 
(pounds), which she brushes aside as unimportant. Once that de‐
cision has been made to send them back and “see what happens” 
(Line 13), there is further discussion of how they had arrived at 
this point, with Sarah pointing out that the furniture was faulty, 
and Wendy taking on the moral responsibility of checking (which 
she admits she had not done). Even that, though, is seen as a joint 
accomplishment, with Sarah too admitting that she had not no‐
ticed the fault.
Throughout their interactions, this pair engaged in commen‐
taries both on the ongoing action, but also on the reasons for it, 
and the steps taken in making decisions along the way. A close 
relationship such as theirs is clearly not only the responsibility 
of the PA; instead, one can see how decisions are finessed and 
mulled over, at the instigation of the person with intellectual 
disability.
15 Sal Yeah? A cup’s just a mug without a
16 handle isn’t it? (long pause)
17 OK we’ll have a go and look at the
18 shapes and see if inspiration
19 strikes you.
Extract 5
01 Sar No we’ll send them back and see what
02 happens alright
03 Wendy? We’ll see what happens, alright?
04 Wen Yeah, and then‐ and then w‐don’t be
05 surprised if they say no
06 Sar Right we’ll go from there and w‐
07 Wen Is that what you mean?
08 Sar Yeah we’ll just go from there and we’ll just
09 see what they say.
10 Wen But don’t worry it’s my my f‐ my responsibil‐
11 you know don’t worry
12 If I lose the money it’s only thirty quid.
13 Sar So, let’s just send them back and see what
14 happens.
15 Alright? At the end of the day, they’re split
16 and they shouldn’t have …
17 Wen It was split but I wish I’d checked
18 Sar …been like that. I didn’t even notice see?
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3.4 | Reflecting on factors in a decision
If a person with intellectual disability needs support to exercise their 
autonomy, one might expect them to be learning from interactions 
about choice, so that their skills to make “wise decisions” would im‐
prove. To some extent that seemed to be happening in Extract 5, 
where Wendy was learning from her mistake that she should have 
“checked” the furniture she had bought. We were interested to ex‐
amine other occasions on which the person with intellectual dis‐
ability started to talk through the contingencies and background, 
regarding both their past and their projected future decisions. 
Extract 6, like much of our data, took place in a kitchen, but related 
to situations outside the here‐and‐now, in this case the forthcoming 
visit of “Den” the boiler repair man.
Jen's account of why she wants her dad in the house (lines 4–10) 
is interesting, since it is not immediately clear what that does in the 
interaction with her PA Rachel. In fact, Rachel's first reaction to Jen's 
mention of her dad is to make a joke (“I'm not letting him in”) which 
is picked up with laughter by Jen in line 4. Of course, the “letting 
dad in” implies that Rachel will still be around at two o'clock, and it 
could be that which prompts Jen's subsequent justification of her 
need to have not only Rachel, but also her dad in the house at two 
o'clock, when a friend “Den” is coming over to mend her boiler. She 
relates this explicitly to her own need to have help in understanding 
things, and Rachel affirms that with a nod, and a “yeah.” This small 
interchange thus serves simultaneously the purpose of planning for 
Rachel's support and help, while also displaying Jen's own awareness 
of how to make a wise decision relating to her needs.
What is evident in both Extracts 5 and 6 is that the person 
with intellectual disability can be heard re‐shaping their own idea, 
checking it out, receiving ideas about the reasoning behind the de‐
cision—or in fact articulating it themselves. There is a real sense in 
these instances that the PA is supporting the capability of the person 
with intellectual disability to make a wise decision, by giving advice, 
implying a sequence of reasoning via the questions asked, or simply 
by listening to and affirming a decision which has been made.
4  | REFLECTIONS AND DISCUSSION
It is a truism to state that people with intellectual disabilities need trusted 
relationships to make good decisions, (Williams & Porter,2017) and we 
only start to learn more about the shape of “relational autonomy” by 
observing it in practice during everyday life. One striking finding in this 
paper was that communication partners tended to seek out what we 
have called “teachable moments,” where attention is directed more 
towards improving the capacity of a person with intellectual disabil‐
ity, than in determining what they really want. We frequently heard a 
conversation partner asking a question to which they already knew the 
answer. This is perhaps most manifestly evident in, and an enduring 
feature of, teacher–student interactions (Hellermann, 2005). In these 
instances, as in Extract 3 in this paper, this practice casts the two 
speakers in pedagogical roles of “teacher” and “learner,” and makes ex‐
plicit their lack of equality regarding specific territories of knowledge.
Supporters and PAs were routinely offering, but then rejecting 
or correcting, choices made by the person with intellectual disability, 
or implying that the initial response was wrong, as in Antaki et al. 
(2008). One conclusion would be that these supporters should reflect 
upon the third principle of the MCA, which indicates that making an 
unwise decision does not equate with a lack of capacity. Simply of‐
fering someone a choice implies or reinforces the fact the individual 
with intellectual disability could be perceived to have less epistemic 
authority (Heritage, 2012), and therefore creates/recreates depen‐
dence in those there to support them. Nevertheless, our analysis 
revealed some important practical implications about how these 
teachable moments could proceed successfully, without undermining 
the autonomy of the person with intellectual disability. To summarize:
• Activities give natural opportunities for “teachable” moments, 
where choice can be offered, especially where one participant 
knows more about the activity than the other.
• Giving immediate negative feedback is sometimes appropriate in 
that moment, but can result in undermining the confidence of the 
person with intellectual disability to learn from their own experi‐
ence in future.
• Foregrounding any restriction or constraint on the decision is 
often appropriate and may help the person with intellectual dis‐
ability to make a good decision.
• Decisions do not always have to be made here‐and‐now, but could 
be deferred to give a longer time to consider options.
Nearly all the data in this paper consisted of conversation during 
practical activity, and much of the decision making related directly 
to the activities underway, reminiscent of Beadle‐Brown's (2015) 
“person‐centred active support.” At times, both the PA and the 
person with intellectual disability were undertaking the same task, 
and at other times, they were doing something slightly different in 
Extract 6
01 Jen me dad might be coming as well a
02 bit later on because
03 Rac oh I’m not letting him in
04 Jen heh heh Just because y’know cos
05 if Den if Den comes about two,
06 I don’t know how long it’s going
07 to take to set up but because
08 you know I don’t understand
09 things, I don’t want him to like
10 take advantage or anything
11 Rac looks at Jen and nods
12 Jen so probably best if I have dad
13 around or something.
14 Rac Yeah
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the same physical space, for instance in the example from the craft 
workshop. Decisions and activity however were not always carried 
out in parallel. There were instances where people exerted their 
right to “executive” control (Boyle, 2008; Collopy, 1995) where a 
speaker asked the other person to enact their decision, as Wendy 
did in Extract 5, circumventing the difficulty of actually doing the 
actions that were necessary. We would thus add that:
• Supporting someone's autonomy does not always equate with en‐
couraging them to perform a task. By following their request to do 
something, one can show respect for their executive autonomy.
There were also examples of more reflective talk about decisions, 
both past and future, in our data—where people with intellectual dis‐
abilities themselves sought out opportunities to discuss their lives. 
Where joint activities were in full flow, however, it was hard for both 
parties to stop and talk about future or present plans, to reflect on wise 
decisions or on the right to autonomy.
• People with intellectual disabilities may want to talk about past or 
future plans or decisions, and to reflect on their own reasoning. 
In a good relationship, this is often a key moment to stop and to 
listen supportively.
Maybe the central implication about relational autonomy arising 
from this research is that sequential positioning is vital. PAs need to lis‐
ten and respond to the other person's turns in the conversation, and to 
ensure that body language, eye gaze and posture reflect that attempt 
to listen, points made strongly by the Misfits Theatre Company (2018). 
Routine strategies in any conversation, such as clarifying and checking 
out what the other person is saying (Kitzinger, 2014), might need to 
become more highly sensitized and adapted when interacting with a 
person whose speech is difficult to understand, such as Paul in our 
first two extracts. Social identities, such as being a competent decision 
maker, are constructed through talk with important others and thus:
• Body language and good listening are important, when the person 
being supported may want to talk about their future plans while 
doing something else.
Having autonomy to make decisions in a trusted relationship can 
mean that the person with intellectual disability simply trusts their 
PA to make the “right” decision for them. At that end of the spectrum 
of decision making, there are still learning opportunities which can 
be seized. However, the balance can be shifted, so that the decision 
is owned more by the person with intellectual disability. Some of the 
strategies highlighted in this paper, for instance, would be for the 
PA to admit that she does not always know best (see Extract 5) or 
to honour the epistemic right of the person they are supporting to 
know about their own life (see Extract 1).
The final point should go to the Misfits Theatre Company (2018), 
whose training film is all about having a “good match” between the 
person with intellectual disability and their PA. What is noticeable in all 
their examples is that, even when that good relationship exists, things 
can easily go wrong—with one awkward moment, an instruction or 
correction at the wrong point, or maybe a lapse of attention where the 
PA fails to notice what the person with intellectual disability is trying 
to say, possibly undermining the person with intellectual disability and 
casting them as incompetent. As the Misfits Theatre Company (2018) 
say in their film, successful support is not just in the hands of the PA; 
the person with intellectual disability themselves can take responsibil‐
ity to ensure there is a “good match” with their PA. Not only did our 
data focus on the skills of PAs and support workers, but it underlined 
the initiations of people with intellectual disabilities who were active 
in seeking out chances to talk about, and make, their own decisions.
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